Maulana Azad's Opening Address

at A.I.C.C. meeting at Gowalia Tank Maidan, Bombay on August 8, 1942

Opening the proceedings, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad referred to the Allahabad Session of the A.I.C.C. and said that the decision taken then was impelled by necessity. They might forget everything but they could not forget the decision taken then. On the failure of the Cripps mission the only course open to them was to take the decision reached at Allahabad, namely, that for the effective defence of the country against foreign aggression the only course was to have the reigns of Government in India's hands. When a nation was denied such authority, it could not effectively resist foreign aggression.

        The menace of aggression to India was ever increasing and the danger which only a distant one a few months ago was fast approaching them. In the face of such danger, it would be a calamity to allow the people to grow sullen and down-hearted. The Congress wanted to see that every Indian youth took part in resisting aggression. If the people of India were indifferent and sullen, the responsibility was not that of the Congress but that of the British Government. All appeals during the last three years to set up a national government in India had been rejected by the British Government.

        If events had been allowed by the British to take a different shape, Indians would have been whole heartedly engaged in the war. The British attitude was one of not allowing Indians an opportunity to put their heart into the war in the service of humanity.

        In the circumstances, said Maulana Azad, there were two alternatives before the country. The first was to wait for the events that might happen. The second was to act and save the country from the threatened invasion.

        In order to instil enthusiasm into the people, they must be made to feel that in participating in the war they would be defending their own hearths and homes. One could not expect them to fight with sincerity .unless they were sure that they were fighting for the protection of their own freedom.

        The Congress, Maulana Azad emphasized, had already

declared that its sympathies were with the democracies but there was no other way of saving India than by bringing about a political change in the country.

        With the imminence of the danger from Japan, it was no longer so much a question of India's freedom but of India's protection. The fundamental test of the Congress demand, if it was granted, was whether it would hamper the effective prosecution of the war with all the responsibility which on him as Congress President, he had not the slightest hesitation in saying that the freedom would mean a new life in their war effort and the change would not endanger the cause of the United Nations. It must necessarily help the cause and the purpose of the war. It had to be remembered that what they wanted was that the reigns of Government should be in Indian hands. They did not demand the withdrawal of such forces also from the country. But they did not realise that such a demand was not practicable.

        They wanted the successful termination of the war in

favour of Democracies.

        If conditions were different, they would not have hesitated to demand the complete withdrawal of the British from India even if it meant exposing the country to the dangers of anarchy and civil war. The demand which was being put forward for a political change in the country was not of such a nature as to upset civil administration and law and order. They wanted a change which would help the prosecution of the war and not bring about chaos. If fair play and justice prevailed, the British Government and their allies would not find the demand such as would bring about chaos and disorder in the country.

        It was sheer travesty to interpret the Congress demand

in the manner interpretted by Sir Stafford Cripps.

        The Congress President explained that the 'Quit India' demand did not mean the physical removal of all the Britishers from India. It only meant the transfer of political power to Indian hands. After the demand had been originally made by Mahatma Gandhi, both Pt. Nehru and himself had gone to Wardha to discuss the matter with Mahatma Gandhi who made it clear to them that it only meant the transfer of power.

Continuing Maulana Azad said that events had reached such a pass that there was no time either for threats or for promises. They must face facts reasonably and act instantly. The Congress did not want promises nor did they want to make promises. The need of the hour was action and action right now on the part of the Congress as well as the British Government. Let the British Government sign India's independence simultaneously. "We will sign our agreement to the United Nations to fight along with them against all aggressors.'' He could say with all the emphasis at his command or speaking with the responsibility attached to the Congress Presidentship that they would he prepared to sign such an agreement. But were the intentions of the British Government honest? Were they willing to grant the independence of India?" Concluding Mr. Azad said the zero hour was fast approaching. They were making a final appeal to the British and to the United Nations and it was the duty of the latter to accept it if their eyes were not blind and their ears were not deaf.

–The Hindustan Times, 8 August 1942
-JANATA, August 13, 2017